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DIVORCE LAW: EXCLUSIONS AND
DISPROPORTIONATE DIVISIONS OF
MARITAL ESTATE
HONORABLE WILLIS J. ZICK*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the exclusion of gifted and inherited assets from
the divisible marital estate upon divorce, under Section 767.255 of the Wis-
consin Statutes.' It discusses each of the following important areas:
1. The identity and character of excludible assets.
2. Income from excludible assets.
3. Appreciation of excludible assets.
4. Life insurance and joint tenancy property as excludible assets.
5. The hardship exception to exclusion.
It also considers the related issue of unequal division of the marital es-
tate to compensate for gifted or inherited assets that have lost their exclud-
ible status or for assets owned prior to marriage, under Section 767.255(12)
and Section 767.255(2), respectively. Also considered is unequal division
under Section 767.255(2r) in favor of the nonrecipient spouse to compen-
sate for excludible assets awarded to the recipient spouse.
Finally, this Article considers the property division treatment of three
classes of assets:
1. Compensation for personal injury.
2. Retirement and disability benefits.
3. Accounts receivable used as a source of income for
maintenance.
II. EXCLUSION OF GIFTED AND INHERITED ASSETS
A. General Principles
Section 767.255 governs the division of property in divorce actions. It
excludes from division gifted and inherited assets or assets purchased with
the proceeds thereof and establishes a presumption of equal division of all
other assets as follows:
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Upon every judgment of... divorce..., the court shall divide
the property of the parties .... Any property shown to have been
acquired by either party prior to or during the course of the mar-
riage as a gift, bequest, devise or inheritance or to have been paid for
by either party with funds so acquired shall remain the property of
such party and may not be subjected to a property division under
this section except upon a finding that refusal to divide such prop-
erty will create a hardship on the other party or on the children of
the marriage, and in that event the court may divest the party of
such property in a fair and equitable manner. The court shall pre-
sume that all other property is to be divided equally between the
parties, but may alter this distribution.., after considering:
(2) The property brought to the marriage by each party.
(2r) Whether one of the parties has substantial assets not subject to
division by the court.
(12) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case de-
termine to be relevant.2
The legislature has thus excluded from the marital estate, as a matter of
law, all gifted and inherited assets and assets purchased with their proceeds.
It has also given the court discretion to compensate, by means of an une-
qual division of the marital estate, for assets brought to the marriage.3 This
reflects a legislative policy determination that only assets acquired during
the marriage, as a result of the efforts of either or both spouses, should be
subject to division. This concept of marriage as an economic partnership is
expressed in Wierman v. Wierman4 as follows:
The principles of equitable distribution for allocating property
upon divorce are based upon the concept that marriage is a partner-
ship or a shared enterprise in which each of the spouses makes a
2. Wis. STAT. § 767.255(2), (2r), (12). In addition to subsections (2), (2r), and (12), nine
other subsections enumerate factors that the court may consider in deciding whether to depart
from the presumption of equal division. They all relate to the issue of division of the marital
estate once it is determined. None of them are relevant to this Article, which discusses the issue of
what assets should be included in the marital estate in the first instance.
3. It is difficult to understand why assets brought to the marriage are not excluded as a matter
of law. There is no logical or equitable reason why, upon divorce, a nonowner spouse should have
a greater claim to assets earned by the other spouse before marriage than to assets received by gift
or inheritance before the marriage. Certainly there is no basis for a stronger claim for exclusion of
assets acquired during the marriage by gift or inheritance than for assets owned by a spouse prior
to the marriage.
4. 130 Wis. 2d 425, 387 N.W.2d 744 (1986); see also Popp v. Popp, 146 Wis. 2d 778, 432
N.W.2d 600 (Ct. App. 1988).
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different but equally important contribution to the family and its
welfare and to the acquisition of its property. Because each spouse
contributes equally to the prosperity of the marriage by his or her
efforts, each spouse has an equal right to the ownership of the prop-
erty upon a divorce....
The equitable distribution-partnership concept of marriage rec-
ognizes that a marriage possesses an important, intangible asset: the
capability of both spouses to contribute to the marriage and to the
acquisition of property through their labor. To the extent that either
spouse is remunerated for his or her labor during the marriage, the
remuneration is marital property. Furthermore, the equitable distri-
bution-partnership concept of marriage in Wisconsin recognizes that
property acquired by gift' is separate property because it was not
obtained through the efforts of the marital partnership but from an
independent source. Thus sec. 767.255 allows a spouse to retain sep-
arate property acquired by gift and to acquire marital property
through the efforts of either spouse.6
Wierman also refers with approval to the established canon of statutory
construction favoring the interpretation that best implements the underly-
ing legislative policy:
This court has repeatedly stated that "the aim of all statutory con-
struction is to discern the intent of the legislature," and that a "car-
dinal rule in interpreting statutes" is to favor a construction which
will fulfill the purpose of the statute over a construction which
defeats the manifest object of the act.7
The thesis of this Article is that the equitable distribution principles
enunciated in Wierman accurately reflect the legislative intent underlying
Section 767.255. These principles are unimpeachable, both equitably and
logically. They are also consistent with the approach taken on the issue of
maintenance in Gerth v. Gerth.8
Upon divorce, the spouses should divide only those assets acquired as a
result of the efforts of one or both during the marriage. There is no reason
5. The reference is to "gift" rather than to "gift or inheritance" because Wierman involved
only a gift. Clearly the equitable distribution principles apply to inheritance as well as gifts.
6. Wierman, 130 Wis. 2d at 439-40, 387 N.W.2d at 750-51.
7. Id. at 433, 387 N.W.2d at 748 (citations omitted). For a good example of an application of
this rule of construction, see Suburban State Bank v. Squires, 145 Wis. 2d 445, 427 N.W.2d 393
(Ct. App. 1988).
8. 159 Wis. 2d 678, 465 N.W.2d 507 (Ct. App. 1990). In Gerth, both parties worked through-
out the 20-year marriage at the same jobs they held at the time they were married. The husband
was earning $37,727 and the wife $17,436 at the time of divorce. The Court affirmed a denial of
maintenance despite this disparity, stating: "The court determined that it was fair for the parties
1993]
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why a spouse should share in an asset received by gift or inheritance or
owned by the other spouse prior to marriage, 9 absent a finding of hardship
under Section 767.255.1° The equitable distribution principles of Wiennan
should control on all issues of exclusion and unequal division under Section
767.255. Each of these issues will be discussed and analyzed in light of this
thesis.
B. Identity and Character of Excludible Assets
The spouse claiming excludibility must be able to identify the asset that
was acquired by gift or inheritance or was acquired with the proceeds of
such asset. Popp v. Popp 1 describes the requirement of establishing identity
as follows: "Identity inquires 'whether the gifted or inherited asset has been
preserved in some present identifiable form such that it can be meaningfully
valued and assigned.' ,12 The burden of proof on the issue of identity rests
on the spouse claiming exclusion. 'I
Once identity has been established, an issue often arises as to whether
the identified asset has lost its excludible character by transmutation as a
result of a transfer into joint ownership with the other spouse. The burden
of proof on this issue rests with the spouse claiming transmutation.4 This
issue is described in Popp as follows: "Character, on the other hand, ad-
dresses the manner in which the parties have chosen to title or treat gifted
or inherited assets .... Transmutation of non-marital property to marital
property can occur when the character of such property is changed.""5
to have different income levels if those levels were unaffected by the marriage and obtained only
through their own natural abilities and hard work." Id. at 682-83, 465 N.W.2d at 509.
In effect, the court is saying that disparate earning capacities that existed at the time of mar-
riage need not be considered as a basis for making a maintenance award. This is analogous to
using unequal division to return property brought into the marriage. It is also saying that only
those changes in earning capacity that occur during the marriage as a result of efforts of one or
both spouses can serve as the basis for an award of maintenance. This is consistent with the
"equitable distribution" principle, which states that only assets acquired during the marriage by
the efforts of one or both spouses should be divided upon divorce.
9. See infra part III (discussing assets brought to the marriage and unequal division of the
marital estate under Section 767.255(2)).
10. See infra part II.F (discussing the hardship exception to exclusion).
11. 146 Wis. 2d 778, 432 N.W.2d 600 (Ct. App. 1988).
12. Id. at 787, 432 N.W.2d at 602 (citation omitted).
13. Marriage of Brandt v. Brandt, 145 Wis. 2d 394, 408, 427 N.W.2d 126, 131 (Ct. App.
1988).
14. Id. at 409, 427 N.W.2d at 131.
15. Popp, 146 Wis. 2d at 788, 432 N.W.2d at 603.
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The law relating to loss of excludible character as a result of transfer
into joint ownership with the nonrecipient spouse has evolved in four recent
decisions, which will be discussed in chronological order.16
In Bonnell v. Bonnell,17 the wife inherited a resort that she and her hus-
band operated during the marriage. Many years after inheritance she trans-
ferred title into joint tenancy with her husband. The trial court found that
she intended to make a gift by this transfer. The Wisconsin Supreme Court,
with no reference to the trial court's finding, concluded that "once the
properties came under... unified ownership.., as joint tenants, they no
longer retained their character as . . . [Mrs. Bonnell's] separate, inherited
property. The properties thus became part of the marital estate subject to
division." 8
In Weiss v. Weiss, 9 the husband received a $5000 gift that he invested in
the purchase of a residence in joint tenancy with his wife. The husband
argued that, unlike Bonnell, there was no evidence of an intent on his part
to make a gift to his wife. The court rejected this argument, stating:
While the Bonnell decision does speak of the wife's intention to
make a gift of the inherited property to her husband, the gift re-
sulted from the conversion of her separate property to joint ten-
any.... Here also, [the husband] has manifested his intent to make
a gift by the conversion of his separate property into a joint tenancy
with [the wife]. Just as Bonnell observed that "[ilt is clear that Mrs.
Bonnell intended to create a joint tenancy in the subject properties"
so also is it clear in this case that [the husband] harbored a similar
intent.20
In Trattles v. Trattles,2" the wife received cash gifts that were used in
part for mortgage payments, repairs, and improvements on a residence
owned jointly with the husband. She attempted to distinguish Bonnell and
Weiss based on the absence of any evidence of intent to make a gift. The
court responded to her argument as follows:
The actions of [the wife] in using her gift proceeds.., serve to estab-
lish evidence of her donative intent....
16. A related issue arises when a portion of an excluded asset has been used for marital
purposes, even though the form of ownership of the remainder has not changed. The contention
that such use transmutes the character of the remainder of the asset has been rejected in both Popp
and Weberg v. Weberg, 158 Wis. 2d 540, 463 N.W.2d 382 (Ct. App. 1990).
17. 117 Wis. 2d 241, 344 N.W.2d 123 (1984).
18. Id at 247, 344 N.W.2d at 127.
19. 122 Wis. 2d 688, 365 N.W.2d 608 (Ct. App. 1985).
20. Id. at 693, 365 N.W.2d at 611 (citation omitted).
21. 126 Wis. 2d 219, 376 N.W.2d 379 (Ct. App. 1985).
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The case law thus far has not addressed the effect of such evi-
dence establishing donative intent. Neither Bonnell nor Weiss22 in-
structed whether such acts constitute a gift as a matter of law or are
merely presumptive evidence of donative intent....
An examination of the authorities from other jurisdictions, cited
with approval by our supreme court in Bonnell, satisfies us that such
acts create a presumption of donative intent, subject to rebuttal by
sufficient countervailing evidence.... These authorities hold that a
change in the character of the property from separate to marital cre,
ates a presumption of an intention to make a gift to the other spouse.
Such a presumption is, of course, rebuttable by sufficient competent
evidence.23
In Fowler v. Fowler,24 the wife deposited gifted money into a checking
account held jointly with the husband. The court upheld a finding by the
trial court that she intended to make a gift, quoting from Trattles that
"[t]he transfer of separately owned property into joint tenancy changes the
character of the ownership interest in the entire property into marital prop-
erty which is subject to division." '25
Fowler ignores the holding of Trattles that a transfer into joint owner-
ship merely creates a rebuttable presumption of donative intent. Fowler
makes no mention of whether the trial court had employed this rebuttable
presumption analysis in making its finding of donative intent.
It is hoped that the Wisconsin Supreme Court will overrule the Bonnell
line of decisions. These decisions conflict with basic rules of property divi-
sion and of gift law, and with the Wierman principles of equitable
distribution.
First, under basic property division rules, it is irrelevant how title to
marital assets is held. All nonexcludible assets are subject to division re-
gardless of which spouse holds record ownership at the time of divorce.
Similarly, gifted or inherited assets should remain excludible regardless of
their form of ownership at the time of divorce. They should be excluded
from the marital estate without consideration of the happenstance of title at
the time of divorce.
This point is best illustrated by assuming a situation in which all assets
acquired during the marriage are titled in the husband's name at the time of
22. This characterization of Weiss seems disingenuous. Weiss held that proof of actual intent
was irrelevant because the transfer itself was sufficient to effect a transmutation of character as a
matter of law.
23. Trattles, 126 Wis. 2d at 224, 376 N.W.2d at 382.
24. 158 Wis. 2d 508, 463 N.W.2d 370 (Ct. App. 1990).
25. Id. at 518, 463 N.W.2d at 373.
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divorce. The husband would not even raise the contention that the wife has
made a gift to him of her interest in these marital assets by agreeing to have
title held in his name. He would make no claim that they had lost their
character as marital assets and belonged exclusively to him.
Similarly, gifted or inherited assets should not lose their excludible sta-
tus simply because the recipient transfers them into joint tenancy during the
marriage. The sole determinant should be whether the assets were acquired
by the efforts of the spouses, so as to be marital assets, or whether they were
acquired by gift or inheritance, so as to be excludible from the marital es-
tate. The source of the assets, rather than their form of ownership, should
control the issue of excludibility.
Further, assume for purposes of discussion that a transfer between
spouses should be given the effect of extinguishing excludibility if it satisfies
the requirements of a valid gift. Under ordinary rules of gift law, any inter-
spousal gift should be considered a conditional gift, conditioned upon a
continuation of the marriage. Such a conditional gift would, of course, be
invalidated by divorce. The basis for this conclusion is found in Brown v.
Thomas.26 In Brown, the court held the gift of an engagement ring to be
conditioned upon entry into marriage, stating:
A gift, however, may be conditioned on the performance of some act
by the donee, and if the condition is not fulfilled the donor may re-
cover the gift.
We find the conditional gift theory particularly appropriate when
the contested property is an engagement ring. The inherent symbol-
ism of this gift forecloses the need to establish an express condition
that marriage will ensue. Rather the condition may be implied in
fact or imposed by law in order to prevent unjust enrichment.27
Thus, an engagement ring is treated as conditioned upon marriage in
order to prevent unjust enrichment. Similarly, a gift to a spouse of exclud-
ible property should be treated as conditioned upon a continuation of the
marriage. It is obvious that the gift of an engagement ring would not have
been made except for an expectation of entry into marriage. It is equally
obvious that the gift of excludible property would not have been made ex-
cept for an expectation of continuation of the marriage.2" In both cases the
26. 127 Wis. 2d 318, 379 N.W.2d 868 (Ct. App. 1985).
27. d at 327, 379 N.W.2d at 872 (citations omitted).
28. In Brown, the court referred to the inherent symbolism of an engagement ring, concluding
that the conditional nature of the gift should be implied as a matter of law. Id. at 327, 379
N.W.2d at 873. A gift between spouses is not as inherently symbolic even though common sense
tells one that the gift would not have been made in the overwhelming majority of cases without an
expectation that the marriage would continue indefinitely. Therefore, it can be argued that a gift
between spouses should merely raise a presumption that it is conditional upon a continuation. of
1993]
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gift was made only because of the special relationship between the donor
and donee. The donee would be unjustly enriched in both instances if per-
mitted to retain the gift upon a termination of the relationship.
Finally, Bonnell and its progeny dramatically conffict with the equitable
distribution principles so persuasively expounded in Wierman.29 In Wier-
man, the wife's father gifted an interest in a real estate venture to her and
her sisters. The father retained control over the venture's operation, selling
various lots and reinvesting the proceeds. At the time of the divorce, all of
the original real estate had been sold, and the proceeds had been reinvested
in real estate, life insurance, and bank accounts.
The Wierman opinion starts by analyzing Arneson v. Arneson 30 and
Plachta v. Plachta,31 both of which will be discussed in detail later. Arneson
holds that income from excludible assets is includible in the marital estate.
Plachta holds that appreciation of an excludible asset is itself excludible
unless it is the result of efforts by one or both of the spouses.
After completing this analysis, the Wierman opinion states: "Although
Plachta and Arneson are important in analyzing this case, it is apparent that
these cases do not furnish a satisfactory solution to this case because neither
case is factually analogous to this case. We therefore look to the principles
of equitable distribution ... for assistance in deciding the case."' 32 It then
goes on to enunciate the principles of equitable distribution.33
The opinion concludes with a determination that all the assets in issue
remain excludible:
In this case neither spouse contributed time or effort.., and the
increase in value is not due to the efforts or abilities of either spouse.
The increase in the value of [the wife's] separate property was
due to market conditions or to the efforts of [the father]. [The fa-
ther's] valuable personal services as business manager were obvi-
ously a gift to his daughter. Thus the increase in value .. . is
attributable not to the efforts of either spouse or to the marital part-
nership but to a source independent of the marriage. Under the
principles of equitable distribution, [the wife's] interest in the ven-
marriage, with the donee having the burden of proof to rebut the presumption, rather than con-
cluding that such gifts are conditional as a matter of law, as contended above.
29. Wierman v. Wierman, 130 Wis. 2d 425, 387 N.W.2d 744 (1986); see also supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
30. 120 Wis. 2d 236, 355 N.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1984).
31. 118 Wis. 2d 329, 348 N.W.2d 193 (Ct. App. 1984).
32. Wierman, 130 Wis. 2d at 438-39, 387 N.W.2d at 750-51.
33. See id. at 439-40, 387 N.W.2d at 750-51.
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ture should be viewed as retaining its character as separate gifted
property and not as marital property.34
By definition, gifted or inherited assets are not the result of effort by the
marital partnership. A change in the form of ownership of such assets by
transfer into joint ownership is irrelevant under the Wierman principles of
equitable distribution.
Pending a reversal of the Bonnell line of decisions, the courts must wres-
tie with the issue of the type of evidence required to overcome the presump-
tion of donative intent.35 There is no discussion of this issue in Trattles or
in any subsequent decision. As discussed earlier, Trattles states only that
the presumption is "rebuttable by sufficient competent evidence."' 36 As also
discussed earlier, Trattles relies upon the three decisions from other juris-
dictions cited in Bonnell to support its conclusion that Bonnell had intended
to establish a rebuttable presumption. Unfortunately, these decisions fur-
nish little guidance. Furthermore, only Conrad v. Bowers37 makes any ref-
erence to this issue, and only in conclusional terms. It states merely that a
transfer between spouses creates a presumption of gift, which can be over-
come by "clear and convincing evidence that the transfer was not intended
as... a gift to the other spouse."'38
As discussed, the Bonnell transmutation rule is in direct conflict with
basic rules of property division and gift law, and with the equitable distribu-
tion principles of Wierman. The resultant undermining of the transmuta-
tion rule deserves great weight in determining what evidence should be
required to rebut the presumption of donative intent. The most logical ap-
proach is to apply the conditional gift analysis previously discussed. How-
ever, the burden of proof must be imposed on the donor rather than the
donee in order to comply with Trattles. Under this approach, the presump-
tion would be overcome by proof that the donor did not intend to make an
unconditional gift. Stated conversely, the donor would be required to prove
that the gift was made because the donor and donee were married at the
time and because the donor assumed the marriage would continue
indefinitely.
34. Id. at 440-41, 387 N.W.2d at 751.
35. The burden of proof is obviously the ordinary civil burden. However, Trattles fails to
discuss what facts must be proved to overcome this presumption.
36. Trattles, 126 Wis. 2d at 224, 376 N.W.2d at 382.
37. 533 S.W.2d 614, 622 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
38. IM. at 622.
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C. Income from Excludible Assets
In Arneson v. Arneson,39 the husband contended that the dividends he
received from gifted and inherited stock should be excluded from the mari-
tal estate. The court rejected his contention, taking a purely semantical
approach to the interpretation of Section 767.255 and stating that "[i]n con-
struing a statute, the primary source is the language of the statute itself."'
Applying this approach, the court concluded that:
[n]othing in ch. 767 indicates that property not acquired by any of
the means recited in the statute (gift, bequest, devise or inheritance)
should be excluded because the purchase moneys were income gen-
erated by an asset entitled to such exclusionary status .... [T]o ex-
tend such exclusion to assets not expressly covered by the statute
represents an unwarranted judicial intrusion into matters more
properly left to the legislature.
The mere fact that the existence of this subsequently purchased
property can be traced to income generated by the gifted property
does not serve to undo the legislative intent manifested by the lan-
guage of sec. 767.255, Stats., which extends exclusion only to prop-
erty acquired by the means recited therein.4
Arneson proceeds on the premise that the literal statutory language is
the sole consideration in determining legislative intent. This approach is
directly antithetical to Wierman, which, as previously discussed, holds that
the legislative intent of Section 767.255 is to subject to division only those
assets earned by the marital partnership, and that this intent should be
given controlling effect in determining the proper interpretation of Section
767.255. Arneson's conclusion that unearned income from excludible assets
is includible in the marital estate cannot withstand scrutiny under the Wier-
man equitable distribution test. However, as will be discussed in Part II.D,
which considers appreciation of excludible assets, the income from exclud-
ible assets is properly treated as a marital asset if its production results from
the efforts of a spouse.
In Wierman, the supreme court did not find it necessary to overrule
Arneson. Rather, it followed the traditional line of least resistance and sim-
ply distinguished Arneson. However, it is reasonable to anticipate that the
supreme court will overrule Arneson when directly confronted with the is-
39. 120 Wis. 2d 236, 355 N.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1984).
40. Id. at 243, 355 N.W.2d at 19 (citing Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 81 Wis. 2d 344, 350, 260 N.W.2d 712, 715 (1978)).
41. Id. at 244, 355 N.W.2d at 20.
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sue, due to the obvious irreconcilable conflict between Arneson and
Wierman.
In any event, Wierman has limited the application of Arneson to income
that comes within the direct control of the owner, such as interest and cash
dividends. Arneson involves cash dividends and is limited to income that
passes into the owner's direct control. Wierman discusses this limited scope
of Arneson as follows:
The court of appeals cautioned, however, that it was not determin-
ing whether the rationale of the decision should extend to income
generated by excluded gifted property where the "income generated
by excluded assets does not pass through the hands of the owner for
purposes of further use or reinvestment... [or where] income or
dividend plans do not vest control in the owner over such property,
or the investment, reinvestment, or other spending decisions."'42
Wierman relies on this limitation in distinguishing Arneson, as follows:
There are, however, significant differences between the dividend in-
come in Arneson and the proceeds of the sales in this case. In Arne-
son . . . the originally gifted property (shares of stock) remained
separate and distinct from the income (cash dividend) it generated.
The owner-husband of the gifted property received and controlled
the income.
In this case, the originally gifted property.., did not generate
income separate and distinct from itself ... The proceeds of the
sales never came into [the wife's] possession or control ....
It is safe to conclude that stock dividends are excludible under Wier-
man. The subsequent decision of Fowler v. Fowler' supports this conclu-
sion. In Fowler, "Baby Bell" stock was substituted for the wife's inherited
AT&T stock as a result of the AT&T divestiture. The court held that the
Baby Bell stock was excludible because it was "merely substituted for the
AT&T stock."'4 Similarly, stock dividends are excludible because the new
shares are merely added to the previous shares. This is the functional
equivalent of substituting the new combined shares for the shares owned
prior to the dividend.
42. Wierman v. Wierman, 130 Wis. 2d 425, 436-37, 387 N.W.2d 744, 749 (1986) (quoting
Arneson, 120 Wis. 2d at 245 n.6, 355 N.W.2d at 20 n.6).
43. Id at 438, 387 N.W.2d at 750.
44. 158 Wis. 2d 508, 463 N.W.2d 370 (Ct. App. 1990).
45. d at 516, 463 N.W.2d at 372.
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D. Appreciation of Excludible Assets
Another recurring issue is the extent to which the appreciation of ex-
cludible assets is itself excludible. All the decisions in this area are consis-
tent with Wierman, even though some of the opinions are confusing. The
result reached in each decision is to exclude all appreciation except that
which results from spousal efforts.
In Plachta v. Plachta,4 the wife acquired by gift during the marriage a
residence worth $6000, which had appreciated to $27,000 by the time of
divorce. Title had been retained in her name. The court held the entire
appreciated value to be excludible. It employed a purely semantical analy-
sis but fortunately reached a conclusion consistent with equitable distribu-
tion principles:
We find nothing in ch. 767 to support the argument that an appreci-
ation in value of nonmarital property takes on the character of mari-
tal property, especially when it has increased in value without any
contributions from the nonowning spouse. Without an express stat-
utory provision to the contrary, assets that are separate property re-
tain that identity and are generally not subject to property division
regardless of appreciation or depreciation in value.4 7
The Plachta opinion then states the truism that the excludible apprecia-
tion on the residence would be subject to division if necessary to avoid a
"hardship."48 The opinion concludes by confusing the concept of a finding
of "hardship" under Section 767.255 with equitable distribution principles:
"Failure to divide separate property could cause a hardship when the no-
nowning spouse contributes to the property's increased value. Under those
circumstances, the trial court may distribute the nonmarital property in a
manner reflecting each spouse's contribution toward the appreciated
value."
49
In Haldemann v. Haldemann,5 ° the wife inherited a farm prior to mar-
riage and retained title in her name. The husband furnished the labor for
repairs and additions throughout the marriage. The trial court awarded the
farm to the wife and excluded the entire appreciated value. The court of
appeals reversed, stating:
First, we conclude that the appreciation in value of separate prop-
erty due to the efforts and abilities of the nonowning spouse, is part
46. 118 Wis. 2d 329, 348 N.W.2d 193 (Ct. App. 1984).
47. Id. at 333, 348 N.W.2d at 195.
48. This conclusion is self-evident because Section 767.255 provides that even the original
nonappreciated excludible asset is subject to division to avoid "hardship."
49. Plachta, 118 Wis. 2d at 334, 348 N.W.2d at 195-96.
50. 145 Wis. 2d 296, 426 N.W.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1988).
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of the marital estate to be divided pursuant to see. 767.255, Stats.
We further hold that it is not necessary that the nonowning spouse
demonstrate that a refusal to divide the appreciation in value will
create a hardship .... 1
The last sentence of this quotation was necessary to clear up the confused
treatment of "hardship" in Plachta.
The Haldemann opinion makes clear that it is predicated squarely on
the principles of equitable distribution:
"The equitable distribution-partnership concept of marriage recog-
nizes that a marriage possesses an important, intangible asset: the
capability of both spouses to contribute to the marriage and to the
acquisition of property through their labor."... Thus, if during the
marriage, both spouses contribute to the acquisition of property
through their abilities and efforts, that property is part of the marital
estate. The property acquired may be the appreciation in value of an
asset separately owned by one of the spouses. 52
The Haldemann decision concludes with a remand to the trial court for
an allocation between economic appreciation and appreciation resulting
from spousal labor and materials.
In Lendman v. Lendman,53 the husband funded a closely held corpora-
tion with $8500 of inherited funds. The husband retained ownership of all
corporate stock throughout the marriage. The corporation used the $8500
as the down payment on the $190,000 purchase price of a funeral home
business. The husband operated the business, in corporate form, through-
out the marriage. The monthly payment on the business note was paid
entirely with income generated by the business. The trial court awarded the
stock to the husband and excluded the entire appreciated value of the cor-
poration from the marital estate. On appeal, the court reversed, ordering
that all appreciation be treated as a marital asset,54 stating:
The appreciation was paid for by corporate "income" generated
through Paul's labors. In this regard, Arneson controls. In that
case, we viewed income generated by an inherited asset as separate
and distinct from the asset itself...
Here, the money used to pay off the corporate debt was earned
income. Thus, just as in Arneson where property purchased by divi-
dend income of an inherited stock was held to be marital, the appre-
51. Id at 300-01, 426 N.W.2d at 109.
52. Id at 302, 426 N.W.2d at 109 (quoting Wierman v. Wierman, 130 Wis. 2d 425, 440, 387
N.W.2d 744, 750 (1986)).
53. 157 Wis. 2d 606, 460 N.W.2d 781 (Ct. App. 1990).
54. Presumably the original $8500 was returned to the husband as an excludible inheritance.
However, the opinion is silent on this point.
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ciation purchased by earned income of a corporation acquired by
inherited funds is also marital.55
As mentioned, all mortgage payments were made with income earned
from the husband's operation of the business. Therefore, all appreciation in
value resulting from reduction of the note56 is a marital asset under
Haldemann. As noted, the Lendman opinion purports to rely upon Arne-
son. However, it fails to recognize the crucial distinction between unearned
income, which Arneson erroneously treats as a marital asset, and earned
income, which is properly a marital asset under the rationale of
Haldemann. It reaches the right result, but under a flawed analysis.
In Torgerson v. Torgerson,57 the wife paid the down payment on a du-
plex with inherited funds and took title in her name. The parties lived in
one unit of the duplex. The income from the rental unit paid part of the
mortgage payment. The balance was paid from marital income, as was the
cost of maintenance and improvements. The trial court awarded the duplex
to the wife and excluded the entire value. The court of appeals reversed,
holding that only the down payment was excludible: "Here, only the down
payment has been made with exempt funds. The statute does not exempt
property purchased by a spouse with his or her marital earnings, as is the
case here."58
Torgerson is basically consistent with the principles in Plachta,
Haldemann, and Lendman. However, the court's analysis is glaringly in-
complete. That part of the appreciation allocable to the down payment
should have been excluded along with the down payment. This is best illus-
trated by assuming a cash purchase of real estate, with half the funds being
inherited and the other half being marital funds. In that situation, half of
the economic appreciation would be excludible as the product of the inher-
ited half of the purchase price. Similarly, in Torgerson, the wife should
have received an exclusion of that percentage of the total economic appreci-
ation equal to the ratio of the inherited down payment to the total invest-
ment of marital funds and labor in mortgage payments, maintenance, and
improvements.
The simplest method of calculating this allocation would be to treat all
of the subsequent marital contributions as having been made at the same
time as the down payment and to weigh them equally with the down pay-
55. Lendman, 157 Wis. 2d at 612, 460 N.W.2d at 784.
56. The opinion assumes that all appreciation in value of the corporation resulted from reduc-
tion of the note balance. Apparently, the real estate was leased.
57. 128 Wis. 2d 465, 383 N.W.2d 506 (Ct. App. 1986).
58. Id. at 469, 383 N.W.2d at 508.
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ment. A more equitable approach would be to determine the date by which
half of the total marital contributions had been made. All appreciation oc-
curring prior to that date would be excludible. All appreciation occurring
after that date would be allocated based on the ratio of the down payment
to the total marital contributions. If a large single marital outlay had taken
place at any given time, a separate calculation could also be made from that
point forward. 9
E. Life Insurance and Joint Tenancies as Excludible Inheritances
Lang v. Lang'° is the controlling Wisconsin decision on the issue of
whether life insurance proceeds and property acquired by survivorship are
excludible under Section 767.255 as an "inheritance." In Lang, the wife
brought to the marriage funds received as the beneficiary of a life insurance
policy on her previous husband's life. She also brought a residence that had
been acquired by right of survivorship upon his death. The supreme court
affirmed the trial court's decision that neither asset was excludible as an
"inheritance."
The wife's first argument in favor of exclusion was that any asset subject
to inheritance tax under Section 72.12(7), such as life insurance, must be
considered "inherited" under Section 767.255.61 In rejecting this argument,
the court noted that Section 767.255 originally excluded only "property in-
herited by either party," but was amended in 1977 to exclude any property
acquired by "gift, bequest, devise or inheritance. ' 62 The court reasoned
that if the legislature had intended the original phrase "property inherited"
to be broad enough to encompass all assets subject to inheritance tax, there
59. Assume a $25,000 down payment from inherited funds at the time of marriage and
$25,000 of total marital contributions at a basically even rate during a 20-year marriage. The
mean payment date for the marital $25,000 would be 10 years. Therefore, the entire appreciation
during the first 10 years would be allocable to the down payment and would be excluded. The
appreciation for the final 10 years would be allocated equally between the $25,000 excludible
down payment and the $25,000 nonexcludible marital contributions, which would be treated as
having been paid in full on the 10-year mean payment date. Assume further that a $25,000 mari-
tal outlay, not included in the $25,000 total already considered, was made at the end of the 15th
year. The marital contribution would total $50,000 at that point, or two-thirds of the investment,
so that only one-third of the appreciation for the last five years would be excludible.
In summary, the entire down payment would be excluded, while all subsequent contributions
of marital funds or labor would be included in the marital estate. All appreciation, being the
excess value over the total of excludible and nonexcludible contributions, would be allocated to
the excludible and nonexcludible components in accordance with the percentage calculations out-
lined above.
60. 161 Wis. 2d 210, 467 N.W.2d 772 (1991).
61. IL at 217-18, 467 N.W.2d at 775.
62. Id. at 218-20, 467 N.W.2d at 775-76.
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would have been no need for the amendment adding "bequest" and "de-
vise," both of which are subject to inheritance tax.6s
Similarly, the court rejected the wife's second argument, stating:
The amendment of sec. 767.255 to include bequest and devise
also undermines the petitioner's argument that inheritance should be
interpreted to include life insurance proceeds because inheritance is
commonly understood to include life insurance proceeds. When in-
terpreting a term used in a statute, its "meaning must be found in its
context and relation to the subject matter." Accordingly, a term
with a common meaning and a technical meaning should be given its
technical meaning if the context in which the term is used calls for
such a meaning.
"Inheritance" was placed by the legislature in sec. 767.255 next
to three terms with a technical meaning in the law: gift, bequest,
and devise. In this context, inheritance should be given the technical
meaning it is assigned in the law....
... The only meaning that is reasonable in the context of sec.
767.255 is the traditional technical meaning of property taken by
descent as the result of the intestate death of another.6 4
The court also rejected the wife's final argument, stating:
The petitioner's third argument ... is that life insurance proceeds
are like bequests, devises, and inheritances and, therefore, should be
treated like them. We disagree. The petitioner is, in effect, asking
this court to insert the words "life insurance proceeds" into sec.
767.255. Doing so would violate four principles of statutory con-
struction. First, it would violate the maxim that the expression of
one thing is the exclusion of another....
Second, we will not read extra words into a statute to achieve a
specific result. Third, exceptions should be strictly construed. Ac-
cordingly, we should strictly construe the words "gift, bequest, de-
vise or inheritance" because they are exceptions to the general rule
that all property of the parties is subject to division.
Fourth, even if it were appropriate to liberally construe the rele-
vant clause of sec. 767.255, we cannot, under the guise of liberal
construction, supply something that is not provided in a statute.65
Finally, the court rejected the wife's contention that the joint tenancy
real estate received by survivorship is an "inheritance." The court basically
relied on the same line of reasoning employed in the life insurance analysis.
63. Id. at 220-21, 467 N.W.2d at 775-76.
64. Id. at 221-22, 467 N.W.2d at 776-77 (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 223-24, 467 N.W.2d at 777-78 (citations omitted).
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Lang makes no mention of Wierman and its emphatic endorsement of
the principles of equitable distribution as the approach that best implements
the legislative policy underlying Section 767.255. Nor does it refer to the
canon of statutory construction relied upon in Wierman, which mandates
the interpretation that best implements the underlying legislative policy.
Instead, Lang places paramount importance on the 1977 amendment that
added the technical terms "bequest" and "devise" to "inherited property."
The court felt constrained by this amendment to take a technical and se-
mantical approach. It construed the amendment as compelling the conclu-
sion that the legislature had intended the term "inherited property" to be
given a technical and restrictive interpretation. The court was therefore
unwilling to employ the expansive, policy-oriented approach of Wierman.
The canons of construction previously quoted from Lang stand in stark
contrast to those relied upon in Wierman.
Lang can be viewed as a unique result compelled by the controlling im-
portance the court ascribed to the technical language used in the amend-
ment. It is hoped that Lang will be limited to the technical issue presented
by its facts and will not be construed in future decisions as having eroded
the continuing validity of Wierman. This hope is strengthened by the previ-
ously noted fact that Lang completely overlooked the existence of
Wierman.
Wierman definitively enunciated the equitable distribution principles
that should govern the determination of all issues relating to exclusion of
assets from the marital estate. The doctrine of equitable distribution re-
flects common sense and fairness. It is completely consistent with the legis-
lative policy underlying Section 767.255. This Article assumes that the
Wierman principles of equitable distribution will be given controlling effect
in the future on all issues relating to exclusions from the marital estate. If
Lang is treated in the future as having impliedly limited Wierman, the con-
clusions herein will be thrown into doubt.
F The Hardship Exception to Exclusion
The proper standard for application of the "hardship" exception to the
gift and inheritance exclusions in Section 767.255 was the subject of some
uncertainty6" prior to Popp v. Popp,67 which established the definitive
standard:
66. See, e.g., Asbeck v. Asbeck, 116 Wis. 2d 289, 342 N.W.2d 750 (Ct. App. 1983).
67. 146 Wis. 2d 778, 432 N.W.2d 600 (Ct. App. 1988).
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We start with the well-accepted proposition that "[t]he division
of property of the divorced parties rests upon the concept of mar-
riage as a shared enterprise or joint undertaking."
... [W]e conclude that the party claiming hardship must demon-
strate that a failure to include the exempt assets in the marital estate
will result in a condition of financial privation or difficulty.... A
hardship determination must therefore be made in light of the facts
and history of the case and the relative financial circumstances of the
parties before and after the divorce. We reaffirm our statement in
Asbeck that this consideration is not limited to essential needs only.
The burden on this question is properly assigned to the party claim-
ing hardship.68
Popp's restrictive definition of "hardship" is consistent with equitable
distribution principles, which provide for inclusion in the marital estate of
only those assets resulting from the efforts of a spouse.
III. UNEQUAL DIVISION OF MARITAL ESTATE UNDER SECTION
767.255(2) AND (12)
Section 767.255(2) and (12),69 outlined in Part II.A, authorize the court
to depart from the statutory presumption of equal division of the marital
estate based on "property brought to the marriage" and "other factors as
the court may in each individual case determine to be relevant,"
respectively.
In Schwartz v. Linders,7 ° the husband inherited approximately $280,000
during the course of the three-year marriage. The trial court held that the
excludible status of those funds had been lost because they had been com-
mingled. It rejected the husband's request for an unequal division to com-
pensate for these inherited assets, ruling that it had no discretion to do so,
under Anstutz v. Anstut. 71 The husband appealed the refusal to make an
unequal division. The court of appeals reversed, noting that Anstutz had
simply stated the self-evident proposition that excludible funds should be
excluded from the marital estate at the outset rather than being included
and then returned to the recipient by means of an unequal division. The
court stated:
We conclude that if inherited property has been commingled,
Anstutz is inapplicable. There is no law saying that the court must
ignore that property was once inherited. In fact, sec. 767.255, Stats.,
68. Id. at 792-93, 432 N.W.2d at 604-05 (citations omitted).
69. Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1991-92).
70. 145 Wis. 2d 258, 426 N.W.2d 97 (Ct. App. 1988).
71. 112 Wis. 2d 10, 331 N.W.2d 844 (Ct. App. 1983).
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seems to suggest the opposite. Section 767.255(2) compels trial
courts to consider the property brought to the marriage by each
party. Surely, this cannot be limited to property brought to the mar-
riage at its inception but must also include property brought to the
marriage at any time which might be subject to division. Addition-
ally, sec. 767.255(12), the "catchall" provision, requires trial courts
to consider other factors as the court may in each individual case
determine to be relevant.
We hold that a trial court has a statutory imprimatur to consider
the prior inherited status of divisible property. Whether that can
result in an unequal division of the property depends upon the facts
of each case. It is enough to say that if the marriage is of short
duration, and the trial court feels that one spouse will receive a
windfall without having participated much in the economic partner-
ship of the marriage, then the once inherited stature of divisible
property may be a cogent reason for dividing an estate unequally. 72
The quoted reference to the term "property brought to the marriage" as
being broad enough to encompass property inherited during the marriage
seems to be in error. The phrase "property brought to the marriage" is
mutually exclusive with assets acquired after the marriage by inheritance
or any other means. However, this erroneous interpretation is harmless be-
cause Section 767.255(12), the "catchall" provision, serves as a sound basis
for return by unequal division of inherited or gifted assets that are acquired
after the marriage and lose their excludible status.
Schwartz is consistent with Wierman, although it unfortunately fails to
refer to Wierman. Under equitable distribution principles, the nonrecipient
spouse should not share in an asset acquired by gift or inheritance, since it
did not result from spousal effort. The fact that such an asset loses its ex-
cludible status by a technicality provides no basis in equity for division with
the nonrecipient spouse. The policies underlying the doctrine of equitable
distribution are justice and fairness. In order to give effect to these policies,
trial courts should utilize unequal division under Section 767.255(2) to re-
turn property brought to the marriage and under Section 767.255(12) to
return gifted or inherited property that loses its excludible status, as a mat-
ter of course.73
72. Schwartz, 145 Wis. 2d at 262-63, 426 N.W.2d at 99.
73. This return will ordinarily be accomplished by awarding off the top of the marital estate
the amount in question, i.e., either the property brought to the marriage or the property received
by gift or inheritance. The balance of the marital estate will be divided equally. If the assets in
question are still in existence, this is a simple exercise. However, if they have been spent, a
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The decisions in Arneson v. Arneson 74 and Lang v. Lang,75 discussed in
previous parts of this Article, are inconsistent with the preceding analysis.
In Arneson, the trial court returned to the wife by unequal division under
Section 767.255(2) the original $13,000 in premarital assets that she had
invested in the marital homestead. The court refused to return any portion
of the appreciation accruing to the homestead during the marriage. Upon
appeal by the wife, the court affirmed, stating:
Nothing in Plachta suggests that its rationale should apply to
property brought to the marriage by either party. The premise of
Plachta is that the property is excluded by statute in the first in-
stance. It does not apply to nongifted and noninherited property
brought to a marriage by either party. We therefore reject any claim
by [the wife] that her property brought to the marriage, and appreci-
ation thereon, should have been excluded or otherwise awarded to
her.
7 6
The Arneson opinion was correct in stating that Plachta concerned only
appreciation of excludible property and did not address property brought to
the marriage. However, Arneson is in direct conflict with Wierman, which
was decided later and which dictates return by unequal division of all ap-
preciation allocable to premarital assets, since the spouses played no role in
their acquisition.
In Lang, as previously discussed, life insurance proceeds and a joint ten-
ancy residence acquired by the wife upon the death of her prior husband
and brought to the marriage were not excludible as inherited property. The
wife had also brought to the marriage the cash surrender value of two life
insurance policies on her life. The trial court rejected the wife's contention
that all of these assets should be returned to her by unequal division under
Section 767.255(2). The supreme court affirmed:
[T]he court may alter the presumed equal division of the property
between the parties after considering a number of factors set forth in
sec. 767.255, including the "property brought to the marriage by
chicken and egg debate arises as to whether they were used to purchase assets in the marital estate
or were used to pay marital expenses.
Upon careful analysis, this inquiry is unnecessary. Assume that the assets in question were
spent for marital expenses so that they are not in existence as part of the marital estate. Under
this assumption, all assets are the result of marital income. The fact remains that the marital
partnership enjoyed the benefit of these assets, which were not earned by efforts of the spouses,
through their use for payment of marital expenses. Under the principles of equitable distribution,
such assets should belong exclusively to the recipient spouse. Obviously, the marital estate would
be correspondingly reduced if these assets had not been available for payment of marital expenses.
74. 120 Wis. 2d 236, 355 N.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1984).
75. 161 Wis. 2d 210, 467 N.W.2d 772 (1991).
76. Arneson, 120 Wis. 2d at 246, 355 N.W.2d at 21.
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each party." Section 767.255(2), Stats. The distribution of the prop-
erty which is subject to division under sec. 767.255 is a discretionary
act and, therefore, will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
In re Marriage of Krebs v. Krebs, 148 Wis. 2d 51, 55, 435 N.W.2d
240 (1989). The record shows that the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion in dividing the property equally, notwithstanding the fact
that the petitioner brought a significant amount of assets to the mar-
riage, given the length of the marriage.7
Lang fails to give effect to the equitable distribution principles of Wier-
man. It is to be hoped that Lang represents merely an example of the broad
latitude given to trial court decisions in divorce actions under the abuse of
discretion standard, rather than an implied undermining of Wierman.78
As discussed, Schwartz refers to the short duration of the marriage as a
factor favoring a return by unequal division, while Lang refers to the
lengthy duration as a factor justifying a refusal to return. This reflects
traditional thinking. It is generally assumed that the longer the marriage,
the weaker the equities in favor of a return. This assumption does not stand
up to careful analysis under the principles of equitable distribution. It is no
more equitable for a long-term spouse to benefit from property acquired
with no spousal effort than for a short-term spouse to do so. Duration of
the marriage may be a factor to be weighed in determining the issue of
"hardship." It is always a crucial factor in determining the issue of mainte-
nance. However, it is irrelevant under equitable distribution principles on
the issue of return of premarital assets by unequal division.
A dramatic example of the injustice that can result from a failure to
apply equitable distribution principles is Brandt v. Brandt.7 9 In this case,
the wife inherited substantial sums of money during the marriage. The ex-
act amount is not clear from the opinion, but an investment account funded
primarily with inherited funds is described as having "a value as of the date
of divorce in excess of $1 million."80 The trial court found that, due to
commingling, the inherited funds in this account had lost their identity and
hence, their excludible status. The court of appeals affirmed, acknowledg-
ing the inherent inequity of awarding one half of these very substantial in-
77. Lang, 161 Wis. 2d at 229-30, 467 N.W.2d at 780.
78. The established rule is that a trial court decision on property division issues will be sus-
tained as long as it represents a reasonable exercise of discretion. Krebs, cited in Lang, holds that
any such decision will be affirmed as long as the trial court considered the relevant facts, applied
the appropriate law, and "demonstrated a rational process in reaching a conclusion that a reason-
able judge could reach." Krebs v. Krebs, 148 Wis. 2d 51, 55, 435 N.W.2d 240, 242 (1989) (cita-
tions omitted).
79. 145 Wis. 2d 394, 427 N.W.2d 126 (Ct. App. 1988).
80. Id. at 405, 427 N.W.2d at 130.
1993]
MARQUEYTE LAW REVIEW
herited funds to the husband: "We observed in Trattles that tracing
represents a 'complicated exercise capable of producing illogical and inequi-
table results.' "81
Obviously, this inequity could have been avoided had the trial court
returned all inherited assets to the wife by means of an unequal division
under Section 767.255(12). A proper application of equitable distribution
principles dictates this result. It also could have been avoided by a remand
by the court of appeals to the trial court with directions to make such une-
qual division. The failure of either court to order an unequal division
thwarted the sound policies of equitable distribution and worked a great
injustice to the wife.
IV. UNEQUAL DIVISION OF MARITAL ESTATE UNDER SECTION
767.255(2R)
Section 767.255(2r), quoted in Part II.A, authorizes the court to depart
from the presumption of equal division based on "[w]hether one of the par-
ties has substantial assets not subject to division by the court.18 2
No case has been discovered in which this subsection has been utilized.
Undoubtedly, this is because it is in direct conflict with the underlying pol-
icy of Section 767.255, which is to divide excludible gifts or inheritances
only to the extent necessary to avoid a "hardship." When hardship is
found, the court will, of course, include the otherwise excludible assets in
the marital estate to the extent necessary to ameliorate the hardship. This
is done by inclusion in the marital estate rather than by an unequal division
under Section 767.255(2r). When the circumstances do not support a find-
ing of hardship, there is no basis for indirectly dividing these excludible
assets by means of unequal division under Section 767.255(2r).
Pfeil v. Pfeil83 is a case on point with respect to this issue. There the
trial court excluded the husband's military disability benefits from the mari-
tal estate, but made an offsetting unequal division of the marital assets in
favor of the wife. The court of appeals reversed, stating:
In giving weight to the fact of future disability benefits being paid to
the [husband], the trial court was doing indirectly what, under fed-
eral statutes and Leighton, it could not do directly. Authority for
such compensatory award or balancing additional payment to the
wife was found by the trial court in... Sec. 767.255 (2r), Stats. We
81. Id. at 413, 427 N.W.2d at 133 (citing Trattles v. Trattles, 126 Wis. 2d 219, 228, 376
N.W.2d 379, 384 (Ct. App. 1985)).
82. Wis. STAT. § 767.255(2r) (1991-92).
83. 115 Wis. 2d 502, 341 N.W.2d 699 (Ct. App. 1983).
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hold that the reach of this statute falls short of authorizing a
division of or offsetting an award for federal military disability bene-
fits or for railroad retirement benefits. 84
This same result was reached in Rommelfanger v. Rommelfanger,85 in
which the court of appeals reversed an unequal division of the marital estate
in favor of the nonemployee spouse, which had been done in an attempt to
compensate for the value of excludible Railroad Retirement benefits.
V. COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY
This section considers the property division treatment of compensation
for personal injuries sustained by one of the spouses before or during the
marriage.
Richardson v. Richardson 6 holds that personal injury proceeds consti-
tute "property" subject to division upon divorce. It also holds that such
property is not excludible, since it is neither a gift nor an inheritance. The
opinion sets forth the rules for division of injury proceeds as follows:
We conclude that when a personal injury claim has at the time of
divorce not resulted in either a judgment or a settlement, the unique
nature of a personal injury claim constitutes a relevant factor that
warrants the alteration of the statutory presumption of equal distri-
bution. Sec. 767.255(12).... Just as each spouse is entitled to leave
the marriage with his or her body, so the presumption should be that
each spouse is entitled to leave the marriage with that which is
designed to replace or compensate for a healthy body. We therefore
conclude that the statutory presumption of equal distribution should
be altered with respect to certain components of a personal injury
claim. Instead of presuming equal distribution of a personal injury
claim, the court should presume that the injured party is entitled to
all of the compensation for pain, suffering, bodily injury and future
earnings. With regard to other components of a personal injury
claim, such as those that compensate for medical or other expenses
and lost earnings incurred during the marriage, the court should
presume equal distribution.
The presumption we announce... does not take away the flexi-
bility a court needs to make an equitable property division. Flexibil-
ity is preserved because the court may alter the presumed
distribution after considering the special circumstances of the per-
84. Id at 504, 341 N.W.2d at 701.
85. 114 Wis. 2d 175, 337 N.W.2d 851 (Ct. App. 1983).
86. 139 Wis. 2d 778, 407 N.W.2d 231 (1987).
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sonal injury claim in that case and of the parties under the statutory
factors listed in sec. 767.255.17
In Krebs v. Krebs,88 the wife was injured in an accident during the marriage.
Both spouses entered into a structured settlement with their auto insurer
under their uninsured motorist coverage. The husband received $1000 plus
$2000 medical payments, and the wife received $24,000 plus $2000 medical
payments. In addition, the wife received monthly payments, which were to
extend for many years beyond the date of divorce. The settlement agree-
ment made no allocation among the various components of the injury
claim. The court concluded:
[T]he structured settlement did not identify what portion of the fu-
ture payments was to compensate for pain, suffering, bodily injury,
future earnings, past medical and other expenses or lost earnings
during the marriage. In spite of the lack of identification of separate
amounts making up the structured settlement, we believe that the
logic of Richardson applies and the trial court should employ the
presumption that the injured person, Karen Krebs, is entitled to the
remainder of the settlement....
Given the facts of this case, equity requires that there be a pre-
sumption that Karen Krebs, as the injured person, is entitled to the
compensation to be received in the future. However, the trial court
must then apply the factors set out in sec. 767.255, Stats.
While there is a presumption that Karen Krebs is entitled exclu-
sively to all remaining payments under the structured settlement,
they are still subject to the relevant factors under sec. 767.255,
Stats.8 9
Krebs seems to extend the Richardson presumption of exclusive entitle-
ment to even those components identified in Richardson as presumptively
subject to equal division when the settlement agreement contains no alloca-
tion. This is a drastic modification of Richardson. If Krebs is given this
interpretation, it will lead to highly incongruous results. When the claim is
resolved by trial, the amounts allocated by the verdict to pre-divorce wage
loss and medical expense will be presumptively divided equally. However,
when the claim is settled without trial and with no allocation in the settle-
ment agreement,9" all the proceeds will presumptively belong to the injured
spouse. This disparity of treatment is illogical and unfair. Additionally, it
87. Id. at 785-86, 407 N.W.2d at 234-35.
88. 148 Wis. 2d 51, 435 N.W.2d 240 (1989); see also infra note 93.
89. Krebs, 148 Wis. 2d at 57-58, 435 N.W.2d at 243-44.




gives the injured spouse control over the outcome by deciding whether to
settle or to proceed to trial.
Richardson states: "We recognize that this case does not raise, and we
do not answer, numerous issues that may arise in determining the division
of a personal injury claim in a divorce action .... ,,91 This language implies
that trial courts will be required to factually determine the reasonable allo-
cation of settlement proceeds between marital and nonmarital components.
This determination necessarily will be based on all available evidence as to
what amount represents reasonable compensation for each element of dam-
age. It will be made at the time of divorce if the settlement has been com-
pleted. If not, it will be made in a postjudgment hearing, with the divorce
judgment providing a formula for division following the allocation.
In Weberg v. Weberg,92 the husband was injured during the marriage
and entered into a nonallocated worker's compensation settlement prior to
divorce. The court affirmed an award to him of the entire balance remain-
ing at the time of divorce, 93 stating:
Richardson limited application of the presumption to compensa-
tion for personal injury and future earnings ....
In Krebs, however, the court appears to have dropped the qualifi-
cation, for there the structured settlement did not distinguish among
the various elements of damage, yet the court applied the Richard-
son presumption....
The same is true here. The record of Weberg's settlement does
not disclose any division or separation based on type of damage.
Under Krebs, that fact is immaterial and the presumption that the
settlement remains the property of the injured person is fully
applicable. 94
This language implies that Krebs has modified Richardson so that all
proceeds presumptively belong to the injured spouse, even in the face of an
allocation by verdict or settlement agreement. This interpretation of Krebs
is too broad. Krebs contains no language purporting to eliminate the Rich-
ardson distinction between marital and nonmarital components when an
allocation is available.
91. Richardson, 139 Wis. 2d at 784 n.3, 407 N.W.2d at 234 n.3.
92. 158 Wis. 2d 540, 463 N.W.2d 382 (Ct. App. 1990).
93. Weberg also discussed the fact that Richardson involved a claim which had not been
resolved at the time of divorce and that Krebs involved payments due after divorce arising from a
settlement reached before the divorce. It then reached the obvious conclusion that the Richardson
rule also applies to that portion of the marital estate resulting from the proceeds of a settlement
completed before divorce. Id. at 548-49, 463 N.W.2d at 385.
94. Id at 549-50 n.3, 463 N.W.2d at 386 n.3.
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It can be predicted that the supreme court will limit Krebs and make the
Richardson dichotomy applicable even when no allocation is available. It
will do so by requiring the trial court to make its own allocation in that
situation. This prediction is based on the inequities and incongruities which
would result from an abandonment of Richardson. Moreover, abandon-
ment of Richardson would conflict with the principles of equitable distribu-
tion by preventing the noninjured spouse from sharing in the
reimbursement of medical expense and wage loss incurred during the
marriage.
Pending clarification, trial courts should continue to apply Richardson
when there is a verdict or a settlement agreement containing an allocation.
When there is neither, they should make an independent allocation and ap-
ply the Richardson dichotomy, despite the uncertainty created by Krebs and
Weberg.
VI. RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY BENEFITS
Retirement benefits earned by a spouse from private, municipal, or state
employment are includible in the marital estate.95 Any portion of such ben-
efits attributable to employment prior to marriage may be returned to the
employee spouse in the court's discretion, by means of an unequal division
under Section 767.255(2), as property brought to the marriage.96 Certain
federal benefits are excludible from the marital estate while others are in-
cludible. This section will consider the controlling decisions in this area.
Mack v. Mack 9 7 holds that federal law permits the inclusion of federal
Civil Service Retirement Act benefits in the marital estate. It also holds
that federal law excludes Social Security benefits.
Rommelfanger v. Rommelfanger98 holds that Railroad Retirement Act
benefits are excludible from the marital estate by federal law. It further
holds that the nonemployee spouse cannot be awarded an unequal division
of the marital estate to compensate for the value of these benefits because
this would indirectly violate the federal statute.
Pfeil v. Pfeil9 9 applies the Rommelfanger rules of exclusion and prohibi-
tion against compensatory unequal division to disability benefits arising
95. See, e.g., Mausing v. Mausing, 146 Wis. 2d 92, 429 N.W.2d 768 (1988).
96. See Rodak v. Rodak, 150 Wis. 2d 624, 442 N.W.2d 489 (Ct. App. 1989). The benefits
earned prior to marriage should be returned to the employee by unequal division as a matter of
course for the reasons discussed in Part II.B.
97. 108 Wis. 2d 604, 323 N.W.2d 153 (Ct. App. 1982).
98. 114 Wis. 2d 175, 337 N.W.2d 851 (Ct. App. 1983); see supra note 85 and accompanying
text.
99. 115 Wis. 2d 502, 341 N.W.2d 699 (Ct. App. 1983).
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from military service. It also holds that $18,000 of disability benefits held
in a bank account at the time of divorce are excludible, but that another
$20,000 of disability benefits had lost its excludible status because it had
been invested in a mortgage note and was no longer "immediately
available."
Thorpe v. Thorpe °° contains an historical discussion of Wisconsin's
treatment of military retirement benefits. Prior to the 1981 McCarty v. Mc-
Carty"o decision by the United States Supreme Court, military pensions
had been included in the marital estate. McCarty held that federal law re-
quired their exclusion. Thereafter, Wisconsin followed McCarty until Con-
gress reversed McCarty by enactment of the Uniformed Services Former
Spouse Protection Act, 10 2 which restored to state courts the power to divide
military pensions upon divorce. 103 Since then, Wisconsin has included mili-
tary pensions in the marital estate.
In Loveland v. Loveland," the husband elected to waive a portion of his
military retirement benefits in order to qualify for an equivalent sum in
Veterans' Administration disability benefits. He made this election because
disability benefits, unlike retirement benefits, are exempt from federal in-
come taxation. The court recognized that such disability benefits are gener-
ally excludible from the marital estate. However, it concluded that here
they should be included in the marital estate because they are the functional
equivalent of the retirement benefits that were waived in order to qualify for
receipt of the disability benefits. It reasoned that the underlying purpose of
the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act required this result.
The court also distinguished Pfeil on the obvious ground that the disability
benefits there did not result from a waiver of retirement benefits.
In Weberg v. Weberg,105 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals stated in dic-
tum that Loveland had been overruled by the United States Supreme Court
decision in Mansell v. Mansell:106
The issue in Mansell, however, was whether "military retirement
pay waived by the retiree in order to receive veterans disability bene-
fits" could be treated as property to be divided between divorcing
parties under the language of the Uniformed Services Former
100. 123 Wis. 2d 424, 367 N.W.2d 233 (Ct. App. 1985).
101. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
102. Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 730 (1982) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 1408
(1988)).
103. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (1988).
104. 147 Wis. 2d 605, 433 N.W.2d 625 (Ct. App. 1988).
105. 158 Wis. 2d 540, 463 N.W.2d 382 (Ct. App. 1990).
106. 490 U.S. 581 (1989).
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Spouses Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. See. 1408. The Court concluded
that the waived retirement pay could not be treated as divisible
property upon divorce. 10 7
In Weberg, the husband was receiving both Social Security and Veterans
Administration disability benefits. He had never been eligible for military
retirement benefits, so the Loveland and Mansell rules did not apply. The
trial court considered both his social security and disability benefits in
awarding maintenance to the wife. The court affirmed, distinguishing Pfeil
and the other authorities relied on by the husband on the ground that they
involved exclusion of disability benefits from the marital estate rather than
the issue of whether such benefits may be considered in making an award of
maintenance. The opinion concluded as follows: "In this case we are not
asked to divide Weberg's benefits or award any portion thereof to his wife.
We are to decide only whether the payments Weberg is presently receiving
may be considered by the court as a factor in assessing his ability to pay
spousal maintenance."' 8
In summary, federal law requires exclusion from the marital estate of
Social Security and Railroad Retirement Act benefits. It also requires ex-
clusion of all Veterans Administration disability benefits, including those
resulting from a waiver of military retirement benefits. However, all such
benefits can be considered as a source of income for purposes of mainte-
nance. All Civil Service and military retirement benefits are includible in
the marital estate.
VII. ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE USED AS A SOURCE OF INCOME
FOR MAINTENANCE
Accounts receivable from a business or professional practice may either
be included as an asset for purposes of property division or considered as a
source of income for an award of maintenance, but not both. This rule was
stated in Hubert v. Hubert :109 "Generally, receivables are to be considered
as assets subject to property division. On occasion, in fixing child support
and maintenance, the family court can consider the accounts receivable as
anticipated income when determining the party's ability to pay. However it
is error if the court double counts receivables." ' 110
107. Weberg, 158 Wis. 2d at 545, 463 N.W.2d at 384.
108. Id.
109. 159 Wis. 2d 803, 465 N.W.2d 252 (Ct. App. 1990).




Except for Wierman, the decisions in the area of excludibility under
Section 767.255 are confused and contradictory. They are based on seman-
tics and myopic logic, with no consideration of underlying policy. Bonnell
and its progeny hold that transfer of ownership into joint tenancy with the
nonrecipient spouse creates a presumption of gift, with a resulting loss of
excludibility. Arneson holds that unearned income from excludible prop-
erty is not excludible because Section 767.255 does not expressly provide for
exclusion of income. The Plachta line of decisions holds that the apprecia-
tion of excludible property is generally excludible because Section 767.255
does not provide that appreciation is not excludible, but that any apprecia-
tion resulting from the efforts of a spouse is includible in the marital estate.
Wierman offers a persuasive rationale for resolution of all issues of ex-
cludibility under Section 767.255, based on policy considerations, rather
than on a sterile semantical approach. The equitable distribution principles
of Wierman are sound law. They dictate that only property acquired
through the efforts of either or both spouses during the marriage should be
subject to division upon divorce. These principles should be applied in
resolving all the property division issues discussed above. They lead to
these results:
1. The Bonnell line of decisions should be overruled. Interspousal
transfer of ownership should not cause a loss of excludibility.
2. Arneson should be overruled. Income from gifted or inherited prop-
erty should be excluded, except to the extent that it results from the efforts
of a spouse.
3. Plachta, Haldeman, Lendman, and Torgerson are consistent with
Wierman and should continue to control. Appreciation of excludible assets
should be exeludible, except to the extent that it results from spousal effort.
4. Property brought into the marriage should be returned by a discre-
tionary unequal division under Section 767.255(2) as a matter of course,
except when such return would create a "hardship," as defined in Popp.
Gifted or inherited assets that have lost their excludible status should be
returned on this same basis, under Section 767.255(12).
Lang ignores Wierman and reaches an inconsistent result. It is hoped
that Lang will be treated in the future as applicable only to the precise issue
addressed and will not be broadly interpreted as impliedly limiting the ap-
plication of Wierman.
The exact state of the law regarding treatment of personal injury pro-
ceeds is uncertain under Richardson, Krebs, and Weberg. It is clear that all
components of compensation, other than wage loss or medical expense in-
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curred during the marriage, presumptively belong exclusively to the injured
spouse. It is highly probable that wage loss and medical expenses are to be
treated as marital assets if they are ascertainable due to allocation in a set-
tlement agreement or a verdict. If no such allocation is available, it is prob-
able that the judge should make an independent allocation and treat these
two components as marital assets, although the law is unclear on this point.
Generally, private, municipal, and state retirement benefits are includi-
ble in the marital estate. Any pro rata portion attributable to employment
prior to marriage should be returned by unequal division under Section
767.255(2), based on Wierman. Civil Service Retirement benefits and mili-
tary pensions are includible. Social Security benefits, Railroad Retirement
Act benefits, and Veterans Administration disability benefits are excludible,
but are to be considered as income for purposes of maintenance.
Finally, accounts receivable cannot be considered as marital assets if
they are used as a source of income for an award of maintenance.
